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ABSTRACT
The design of a low cost broadband Intentional
Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) detector and
antenna to achieve a flat frequency response over a
broad range is considered. SPICE simulation of the
antenna, detector and low power log-amplifier circuit is
used to predict the detector performance. The SPICE
Antenna model is derived from numerical
electromagnetic simulation. Simulations are compared
with measured performance.
INTRODUCTION
The possible use of Intentional Electromagnetic
Interference (IEMI) to disrupt critical infrastructure is
becoming a significant concern [1]. One aspect of this
threat is detecting the cause of a system failure. A
failure due to IEMI may be blamed on faulty hardware
or software, and much time and money may be wasted
on searching for the cause, particularly if the failure is
intermittent. It is therefore beneficial to consider how
IEMI attacks may be detected. A number of IEMI
detector systems have been developed previously such
as those in references [2] and [3] which can detect
IEMI. Although reference [4] describes a system that
can determine the direction to the IEMI source, we
have not been able to find references describing
practical systems capable of determining the complete
location of the source. In this paper, we describe a low
cost detection system being developed as part of the
STRUCTURES programme [5]. The STRUCTURES
programme is one of several EU funded research
programmes evaluating the effects of IEMI on critical
infrastructure, including protection and detection. A
complementary identification and location system is
also being designed and a brief description is included
in this paper for comparative purposes.
DETECTOR DESIRABLES
The three most important requirements for the
detection system are the ability to detect an IEMI
attack and generate an alarm, to send the received data
for logging and post-processing, and to be cost-
efficient. Additional features, such as locating and/or
identifying the source of the attack, require designing a
significantly more complex system, which is thus
likely to be more expensive. Within the
STRUCTURES project we are developing both, low-
cost and high-performance detectors outlined in this
paper.
Detection of threat
Clearly the first desirable property of a detector is that
it can successfully detect the presence of an IEMI
threat. False alarms should also be minimized. A field
detector must have some means of discriminating
between IEMI threats and other intentional or
accidental sources such as mobile phones and
electrostatic discharge. For simple detectors the
discrimination between threat and other fields might be
largely based on the level, though this can also be aided
by ensuring that the detector is located away from
expected transmitters such as mobile phones. A more
complex system might be able to discriminate on the
basis of frequency content and/or the time domain
waveform. Similarly, a conducted interference detector
must be able to differentiate between normal levels
of transient and noise on a wire and that introduced by
IEMI.
Since most radiated IMEI sources are likely to use high
gain antennas with narrow beam widths, it seems
advantageous that a number of detectors are placed
around any sensitive equipment, sufficiently close
together that at least one detector will see the beam of
any attack, even if it is slightly mis-directed.
The susceptibility level of equipment used in industrial
applications should be greater than 10 V/m and typical
failure levels can be considerably higher and tend to
increase with frequency [6] & [7]. Therefore, a detector
should be sensitive to levels above 10 V/m and if the
detector is placed between the source and equipment to
be protected, it is likely to have an alarm threshold
considerably greater than 10 V/m.
Sources are available at ever increasing frequencies but
their complexity increases with frequency. Although
the majority of available sources operate below 3 GHz
[8], detection at higher frequencies is desirable to allow
for future developments.
Communication and logging
In order to allow notification of a threat and subsequent
analysis (forensics) of the time, duration and number of
attacks, some mechanism is required for the data from
a number of sensors to be communicated to a local or
remote monitoring and logging system, to send alerts
and alarm indications (e.g. to a security office).
Identification of threat
Identification of the type of interfering signal is
desirable, partly to discriminate between signals that
may not be IEMI, such as a nearby mobile phone, and
partly to aid in tracking the source of interference. A
simple system is likely to be able to determine simple
waveform features such as whether the threat is CW,
long or short pulse, but will be unable to observe
details of very fast rise time or short pulses. A more
sophisticated system may seek to determine frequency,
rise-time, Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF), etc.
which can provide a picture of the source type in use.
Location of threat
Location of the source of the threat would enable
action to be taken to identify and apprehend the
perpetrators of the attack. It is possible that a simple
system can give some indication of the location of a
threat if a large number of detectors are used, simply
by observing which detectors are triggered. A more
complex system can use many techniques for direction
finding, such as those based on antenna directivity,
time difference of arrival, etc.
Cost
Any practical detector system will also have to be
affordable. A low cost system may only be able to
detect the presence of a possible threat, whereas a
system capable of identifying and locating the threat is
likely to be more expensive. Within the
STRUCTURES project we are developing both low-
cost and high performance detectors outlined in this
paper.
A MODULAR DETECTOR SYSTEM
Here we propose a concept of a modular IEMI detector
system and discuss how one such system can be
upgraded to achieve localization and identification of
an IEMI source.
Low cost detectors
Figure 1. shows the concept of the low-cost IEMI
detection system being developed in the
STRUCTURES project. Multiple sensors are coupled
to a (protected) computer system for warning, logging
and analysis. Optical fibre communications provide
robust communications, though wireless or wired links
may be desirable in some cases.
Figure 1. Low cost IEMI detector system concept
The block diagram for individual low-cost detectors is
shown in Figure 2. In a low cost system it is desirable
that each detector unit operate on battery power for
extended periods. Low-power consumption could be
achieved with the assistance or solar or other
scavenged energy sources.
Low power operation is possible for many
microcontrollers, and wireless links such as Zigbee [9].
Optical links can also be operated at very low power
consumption levels, making battery operation possible.
Wired network connections tend to have much higher
power consumption requirements but power over
Ethernet is becoming readily available.
For the conducted and radiated IEMI detectors, a wide
dynamic range is required and this implies the use of a
logarithmic amplifier. Whilst commercial broadband
logarithmic detectors with high dynamic range and
operating frequencies up to 10 GHz are available, their
power consumption is high, around 100 mA, and so
they are not suitable for battery powered operation. The
design of a low powered radiated IEMI detector with
logarithmic amplifier is the subject of the remainder of
this paper.
Figure 2. Detector concept
LOG AMPLIFIER AND DETECTOR DESIGN
Design concept
Figure 3. Log amplifier and detector design concept
An initial simulation of the diode detector shows
that the limit of sensitivity is about 10mV. It can also be
seen that the detector output is temperature sensitive so
some means of compensation is required.
Measurements showed that the detector was useable
down to about -40dBm input (4.47mV).
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Figure 4. Log amplifier and detector initial design
Log amp design and performance
Figure 5. Detector performance models
Figure 5. shows the input v output voltage for the
detector, when attached to the log amplifier when
driven by a dc source and when capacitively coupled to
an ac source. The dc case is easy to simulate but
diverges from the ac case for small inputs.
Figure 6. Detector output as a function of ac input at 1GHz
Figure 6. shows the output of the log amplifier with the
dec offset removed, when driven by a dc source and
when capacitively coupled to an ac source, along with
measured data. As the offset voltage varies in each case
the offset has been removed by setting the outputs to be
equal at 0.1Vpeak input.
Figure 7. Effect of temperature on log amplifier
Unfortunately both the detector diode and the log-amp
transistor junctions suffer a variation of voltage with
temperature so is necessary to compensate for this
effect.
Figure 8. shows the completed circuit, consisting of
two log-amp detector circuits driving a differential
amplifier followed by an active peak detector. Also a
model of the antenna is included, connected to the
detector and connected to a linear equivalent of the
detector model. The antenna model is discussed later.
The second log-amp detector circuit is necessary to
compensate for the temperature drift of the detector and
log-amplifier. The output of the second log-amp
detector circuit is subtracted from the output of the rf
driven detector and log amplifier circuit by a
differential amplifier. A peak detector circuit is also
added to make measurement of transient peaks easier.
In this circuit the model shows no detectable change in
output voltage with temperature. There is however a
small change in the log-amp gain with temperature that
is not compensated.
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Figure 8. Log amplifier and detector final design including antenna model and linear detector/antenna model
Antenna design and performance
Kanda [10] showed that it is possible to achieve a flat
frequency response over a broad bandwidth using a
simple dipole antenna directly connected to a detector
diode. This is due to the fact that the detector charges
its output capacitor which eventually reverse-biases the
diode so the antenna sees only the diode capacitance as
its load. A dipole like antenna below resonance
exhibits a purely capacitive impedance and this acts as
a frequency independent potential divider with the
diode capacitance.
We would like to achieve a useable operating range
towards 10 GHz. An 8 mm monopole has a quarter
wave resonant frequency of approximately 9 GHz and
Figure 9. shows the frequency response of the
monopole driving the capacitive load of the diode
simulated using the CONCEPT [11] full-wave
numerical electromagnetic simulator. A significant dip
in antenna factor can be seen as the antenna passes
through resonance.
Figure 9. 8mm monopole antenna factor
Figure 10. 8mm Quad-blade antenna with increased capacitance
From Figure 6. The measured results indicate that we
can detect voltages as low as about 20 mV. For an
8mm dipole with a 57 dB/m antenna factor (SeeFigure
9. ), the corresponding minimum detectable field
sensitivity is:
V/m2.1111   AFVE
Since the antenna forms a capacitive potential divider
with the detector, the antenna factor can be controlled
by modifying the antenna capacitance. Figure 10.
shows an 8 mm high antenna with increased
capacitance. We chose the shape as recent experience
in designing a broadband antenna for reverberation
chambers [12] shows that the taper at the base radiates
well at frequencies above resonance and it suppresses
the effect of the monopole resonance(s). It can be seen
(Figure 11. ) that the increase in capacitance results in a
small reduction of antenna factor. The reduced antenna
factor of 53.5 dB results in an increased sensitivity of
the detector such that the minimum detectable field for
a detector sensitive to 20 mV is:
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The change in sensitivity was smaller than expected
and the resonance is still present as we were unable to
manufacture a small enough feed gap to achieve the
same performance as in [12].
Figure 11. 8mm quad-blade antenna factor
Detector Frequency response
The antenna behaviour can be simulated using a SPICE
model of the antenna derived from the monopole
model proposed by Tang et al [13]. Figure 12. Shows
the antenna factor for a simple linear model of the
detector using just the diode capacitance and the
SPICE AC simulation result using a more detailed
model of the diode.
Figure 12. SPICE model of Detector frequency response showing
antenna factor of Quad-blade with BAT62 diode for the linearised
real circuit (blue) and simple antenna detector model (green).
The SPICE model can also be used to estimate the time
response of the detector to pulsed waveforms. Figure
13. Shows the time response to a large sinusoidal input
(800 V/m). The rise time of the detector is about
200 ns. Figure 14. Shows the time response to a
10 V/m sinusoidal input. It can be seen that the rise
time is much slower and the detector does not fully
respond in the 5 Ps pulse width. This is due in part to
the non-linearity of the diode detector and in part due
to the log-amp having a slower rise-time for smaller
signals. We therefore had some concern as to whether
the detector would respond adequately to some of the
short pulses found in IEMI waveforms
Figure 13. SPICE model of Detector showing time response of the
detector to a 100 MHz sinusoidal input. The top trace shows the
incident field in V/m and the bottom trace shows the microwave
detector output (dark blue), the differential amplifier output (light
blue) and the peak detector output (magenta).
Figure 14. SPICE model of Detector showing time response of the
detector to a 100 MHz sinusoidal input. The top trace shows the
incident field in V/m and the bottom trace shows the microwave
detector output (dark blue), the differential amplifier output (light
blue) and the peak detector output (magenta).
Currently measurements are underway to characterise
the detector performance and compare it with the
model results. The simple model above omits many
parasitic elements so exact correspondence is not
expected but preliminary data shows the detector has
good performance up to about 6 GHz.
IEMI DETECTOR SYSTEM TEST RESULTS
To-date the detector system has undergone some
preliminary tests at Rheinmetal up to 1GHz CW and
with several pulsed sources.
Figure 15. and Figure 16. Show the experimental setup.
Figure 17. shows a detailed view of the antenna and
detector realised on a FR$ PCB laminate.
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Figure 15. IEMI detector test setup with pulse generator at
Rheinmetals a nechoic chamber
Figure 16. IEMI detector test setup at Rheinmetals Anechoic
chamber
Figure 17. Close up of quad blade antenna
Figure 18. Incident field from pulse generator measured with D-dot
sensor
Figure 19. IEMI detector log-amplifier detector output for 800V/m
pulse
The incident field was measured using a D-dot sensor
[15] and Figure 18. shows the measured field
waveform from a 4 kV double exponential pulse
generator driving a Vivaldi antenna. This is obtained
by integrating the output of the D-dot sensor.
The initial pulse width is less than half a nanosecond
wide and is much shorter than the time constant of the
detector and amplifier circuits. Figure 19. Shows the
output of the Analogue to digital converter connected
to the peak detector output for an 800 V/m pulse from
the pulse generator. Due to the fact that the pulse is
shorter than the time constant of the detector the
detector does not record the full pulse amplitude. The
first two pulses are shown as a smaller amplitude  this
is the power supply of the pulse generator ramping up
to full voltage as it is switched on. The red line is the
trigger state of the detector: low is not triggered and
high is triggered. A number of pre-trigger samples are
also shown.
CONCLUSIONS
An outline of the use of SPICE and CONCEPT to
predict the performance of an Intentional
Electromagnetic Interference Detector has been
presented. Currently the performance of the detector is
being evaluated and we hope to present further results
during the conference.
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